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L Introduction
The notion of human rights stems from protections initially instituted
for the protection of religion.2 The extension of these rights, however, has
resulted in situations in which subsequently recognized human rights
sometimes conflict with their theoretical forebears.3 This conflict presents an
issue of social justice worthy of consideration by legal scholarship concerned
with the development of civil rights and the origins of social justice. This
Note examines the conflicting human rights behind the Ten Commandments
cases in order to illustrate the role that religious liberty plays in the religious
protections afforded by the First Amendment.4
The United States Supreme Court decided two Ten Commandments
cases in 2005, generating much confusion in the media and in subsequent
legal scholarship. The Washington Post described the decisions as leaving
the law "more or less unchanged.' '5 The New York Times, however, wrote
of a shift-at least in the balance of power on the Court regarding
Establishment Clause issues.6 Furthermore, the press coverage presented the
results of these cases as confusing and divisive-even summarizing the
results as potentially guiding future decisions to uphold "religious symbols
that have been on display for many years, with little controversy ... while
newer displays intended to advance a modem religious agenda will be met
with suspicion and disfavor from the [C]ourt.
7
Such portrayals of these decisions could lead casual observers to
believe the Supreme Court ignored important issues of equality and justice.
A closer reading of the decisions, followed by analysis of the Court's
reasoning, therefore seems appropriate. Part II of this Note presents a
summary of the two cases, while Part 1I addresses the issues arising as a
result of those decisions. Part IV then analyzes the Court's analytical
framework for Ten Commandments cases, presents other tests that lower
courts have used, and examines the strengths and weaknesses of the tests.
Part V concludes by addressing the propriety and viability of the approach of
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ").
Charles Lane, Court Split Over Commandments; Justices Forbid Copies on Walls of
Courthouses but Allow Monument, WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at Al.
6 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow a Commandments Display, Bar Others, N.Y. TMES, June
28, 2005, at AI (indicating that the balance of power shifted to Justice Breyer).
7 Id.
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coercion as an alternative to the prevailing frameworks, which could clear up
some of the murkiness of the jurisprudence surrounding public displays of
the Ten Commandments.
II. The Supreme Court's 2005 Ten Commandments Cases
The twin Ten Commandments cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 2005, McCreary County v. ACLVf and Van Orden v.
Perry,9 provide a recent example of the issues that arise under the
Establishment Clause. Many observers viewed these cases as offering the
Court an opportunity to clarify its analytical approach, not only in the realm
of Ten Commandments cases, but also to the Establishment Clause
generally.' 0 These decisions, issued the same day, exemplify a jumbled
Establishment Clause jurisprudence issuing from a deeply fragmented Court.
Neither opinion commands an intact majority of the Court; instead, several
pluralities and individual opinions join to reach the holdings of the cases
without arriving at a conclusive means for arriving at those resolutions."
These opinions present several different approaches to the Establishment
Clause, and thus provide an opportunity to evaluate the approaches'
conformity with the concept of religious liberty embodied by the religion
clauses.
A. McCreary County v. ACLU
The case of McCreary County v. ACLU resolved a conflict arising
from the efforts of two Kentucky counties to erect public displays including
the Ten Commandments in their county courthouses. 12 Groups opposed to
the displays mounted a series of challenges, yielding a complex procedural
8 See discussion infra Part HIa.
9 See discussion infra Part ll.b.
10 See Adam M. Conrad, Note, Hanging the Ten Commandments on the Wall Separating Church
and State: Toward a New Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 38 GA. L. REV. 1329 (2004) ("Because of
flaws in the current jurisprudence, no coherent Ten Commandments rule can be salvaged from the present
Establishment Clause landscape. Thus, to create a clear consistent Ten Commandments rule, the Supreme
Court must articulate a clear and consistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence.").
I Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1227. McCreary does not present a pure majority in that Justice
O'Connor, whose vote contributed to the five-vote majority, felt a need to write separately to clarify her
position. Thus, the five votes of the majority opinion do not represent a true consensus on Establishment
Clause issues. Likewise, Justice Breyer's position in the two cases also indicates the absence of a solid
majority.
12 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005).
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history.1 3 The buildup to the case and the facts on which the Court decided it
warrant careful attention here before turning to the interplay between
McCreary and its companion case, Van Orden v. Perry, and the issues
arising when the two are juxtaposed.
In McCreary, the controversy began when the two Ten
Commandments displays were first posted.14  Both displays triggered
lawsuits that requested the court enjoin the counties from displaying them,
which led each county's legislative body to enact a resolution providing for a
more extensive exhibit.1 5 The resulting displays were intended to convey the
notion that the Ten Commandments constitute Kentucky's "precedent legal
code.' 6 Both counties' modified exhibits showed the Ten Commandments
"surrounded by texts containing religious references as their sole common
element."17
Lawsuits filed at that point resulted in orders to remove the displays,
with prohibitions against "erect[ing] or caus[ing] to be erected similar
displays."1 8  Each of the counties installed a third display which included
nine documents of equal size.' 9 One of these documents comprised of the
Ten Commandments from the King James Version of the Bible. The others
included the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of
Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the
National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of
Lady Justice.2' The ACLU challenged the displays' constitutionality and
13 Id. at 850-59.
14 Id. at 850.
15 Id.
16 Id. (internal citations omitted). McCreary County required that the display "be posted in a very
high traffic area of the courthouse." Id. at 851. Pulaski County hung the commandments in a public
ceremony imbued with religious themes. Id.
17 Id. at 850. The modifications added to the Ten Commandments eight other framed documents.
Id. at 853-54. The size of the Ten Commandments in this intermediate display dwarfed the other
documents. Id. Further, the excerpts of those other documents carried clear religious messages with little
other unifying content. Id. The eight accompanying documents were "the 'endowed by their Creator'
passage from the Declaration of Independence; the Preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the national
motto, 'In God We Trust'; a page from the Congressional Record of February 2, 1983, proclaiming the
Year of the Bible and including a statement of the Ten Commandments; a proclamation by President
Abraham Lincoln designating April 30, 1863, a National Day of Prayer and Humiliation; an excerpt from
President Lincoln's 'Reply to Loyal Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation of a Bible,' reading
that 'the Bible is the best gift God has ever given to man'; a proclamation by President Reagan marking
1983 the Year of the Bible; and the Mayflower Compact." Id. at 854.
18 Id. (internal citations omitted).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 856.
21 Id. at 856. The counties labeled this third exhibit "The Foundations of American Law and
Government Display." Id. Each document, displayed in equal sized frames, carried a comment about its
significance to the law and to history. Id.
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requested a similar injunction to require their removal.22 The District Court
granted that request, which the Sixth Circuit upheld, basing its decision
partly on the displays' contentious history.23 That court further reasoned that
the counties acted pursuant to a religious purpose rather than an educational
or secular purpose.24 It also concluded that the third display failed the
tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,25 in that there was no genuine secular
purpose underlying the third display and it had the effect of an
endorsement.26
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the constitutionality
of the third display.27 The Court limited the issue on review, refusing to
consider the constitutionality of the third display in isolation from its
litigious and contentious history.28 Justice Breyer expressed his justification
for reaching disparate results as "judicial judgment" in his concurrence in the
companion case to McCreary, the case of Van Orden v. Perry.29  This
exercise of "judicial judgment" led the majority in McCreary to affirm the
Sixth Circuit's decision, finding the displays to violate the Establishment
Clause.
Justice Souter wrote for a five-vote majority, finding that the exhibits
manifested an unconstitutional religious purpose.30  The majority opinion
analyzed the issue under the "secular purpose" prong of the Lemon
analysis.3 ' In concluding that the displays failed to manifest a predominantly
secular purpose, the Court relied on their development from the first displays
22 Id.
23 Id. at 858. The district court also based its decision on a reading of Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980) (per curiam). Under this reading, the counties' decision to post the Ten Commandments
partakes of a foundationally religious motivation, rather than of a secular purpose. Id. at 857 (internal
quotations omitted). Such reasoning suggests that any display with inherent religious content violates the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 854-55. Furthermore, the court argued that when the counties supplemented
that unacceptable display with other documents centered on a religious theme, they aggravated their
violation of the Establishment Clause. ACLU of Kentucky et al., 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 848 (E.D. Ky.
2001).
24 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 854-55.
25 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court set forth a three-pronged
analytical framework for Establishment Clause analysis. First, a reviewing court analyzes whether
government has "a secular legislative purpose." Id. at 612. Second, its "principle or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. at 612-13. And finally, the action must not "foster
,an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Id. (internal citation omitted).
26 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 854-55.
27 Id. at 858.
28 Id. at 866.
29 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699-704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). See discussion,
infra Part ll.b.
30 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 858.
31 Id. at 859.
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that manifested only the Ten Commandments.32 The Court interpreted this
history underlying the counties' exhibits as evidence of a primarily religious
purpose.33 The majority further reasoned that the notion of neutrality
buttresses this result, finding that this concept persuasively ties the two
religion clauses together.34
Although five justices agreed with this result, Justice O'Connor
wrote separately to emphasize her interpretation of how the Establishment
Clause should apply to the facts presented.35 She cites instances in which the
Court has interpreted the religion clauses, but defers to the majority's
analysis of this case. 36 Given the five-vote majority (and Justice O'Connor's
concurrence), the McCreary decision points to the history of the displays as
the determinative factor in its affirmation of the district court's holding that
the displays violated the Establishment Clause for want of a predominantly
secular purpose.37 In justifying this conclusion, the Court relied on the
touchstone of neutrality.38 If the county action violated this touchstone, the
Court would deem it a violation of the Establishment Clause. 39 The Court
seemed implicitly to define neutrality as requiring an exclusively secular
purpose instead of merely a secular purpose as required by Lemon.40 Under
this analysis, the counties' actions violated the clause and the displays failed
the test.
Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary cites numerous historical
examples where the American government has consistently acted favorably
toward religious practice, generally, without favoring any religion
specifically. 41 These examples include the Presidential oath, the traditional
opening to sessions of the United States Supreme Court, the opening of
legislative sessions of Congress with prayer, the legislation providing for
paid chaplains to the armed forces enacted during the same week as the First
Amendment, President Washington's Thanksgiving Proclamation, the
Northwest Territory Ordinance, Washington's first Inaugural Address,
Jefferson's second inaugural address and the prayer with which it began,
Madison's first inaugural address, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the national
32 Id. at 865-71.
33 Id.
SId. at 873.
35 Id. at 881-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36 Id.
31 Id. at 857.
38 Id. at 860 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 885-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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motto. 42 Scalia points out that these examples, together with the continued
similar practices of state and federal governments, belie the Court's
conclusion that the Constitution forbids government from favoring religious
practice generally.43  He also notes that a majority of the then-current
members of the Court had repudiated the Lemon analysis, which here served
as the basis for the Court's opinion.44 Scalia goes on to rebut the majority's
criticism of his dissent by claiming that he relies not merely on views of the
Founders but on "official acts and official proclamations of the United States
or of the component branches of its Government . . .,,4 He argues that
these official acts (just like those cited by Stevens in the majority opinion) do
not bear the same weight as the text of the Constitution; however, Scalia
urges that the official acts do assist the Court to ascertain the meaning of the
Establishment Clause.46
According to Justice Scalia's view, the majority opinion "ratchet[s]
up the Court's hostility to religion. ''47 Scalia's perception of such hostility
rests on two main points: first, the majority uses its inquiry into legislative
intent to ascertain what appearance the government action would have to a
reasonable, detached observer;48 second, the majority expands the Lemon test
to require more than "a secular . . .purpose" as the Court required in
Lemon.49 Here, the majority indicates that having a secular purpose does not
suffice; rather, they require that the government's nonreligious purpose or
purposes must "predominate" over the religious purpose or purposes.50 The
developments in Establishment Clause jurisprudence illuminated by Justice
Scalia of this "ratcheting" effect and of the distinction between actual and
42 Id..
43 Id. at 889. Scalia writes: "With all of this reality... staring it in the face, how can the Court
possibly assert that 'the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between . . .religion and
nonreligion,'. . . and that 'manifesting a purpose to favor .. .adherence to religion generally' . . . is
unconstitutional? Who says so? Surely not the words of the Constitution. Surely not the history and
traditions that reflect our society's constant understanding of those words. Surely not even the current
sense of our society .... Nothing stands behind the Court's assertion that governmental affirmation of
the society's belief in God is unconstitutional except the Court's own say-so ... ." Id.
Id. at 888-89.
45 Id. at 895.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 900.
48 Id. at 901. Scalia notes that under this view, even if the government acted without any actual
intent to favor or advance religion, that action would violate the Establishment Clause if it gave the
perception of such favoritism to an observer-regardless of whether or not the action actually would favor
or advance religion. Id.
49 Id. at 901-02 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
50 Id. at 901.
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perceived endorsement show the deep divide among jurists regarding the
intent and meaning of the religion clauses.
B. Van Orden v. Perry
The Supreme Court's decision in Van Orden v. Perry presents a very
different approach to Establishment Clause analysis, one that reaches the
opposite result in a similar legal challenge. 51 This case involved a large
monument (six feet tall and three-and-one-half-feet wide) inscribed with the
Ten Commandments and placed on the Texas State Capitol grounds.52 The
grounds also housed some sixteen other monuments and twenty-one
historical markers.53 The Ten Commandments monument stood between the
Capitol building and the Texas Supreme Court building, where visitors
would notice it prominently.54 The Court noted the other inscriptions on the
monument: an eagle grasping the American flag; an eye inside a pyramid;
two tablets resembling the Ten Commandments; two Stars of David; and the
Greek letters Chi and Rho (representing Christ). This monument had stood
for more than forty years without any complaint prior to the lawsuit filed by
56Van Orden. Van Orden had passed by the monument regularly for
approximately six years before challenging its constitutionality.57
The Court held that these facts presented a valid, constitutional
display by the Texas government.58 It reached this conclusion after rejecting
the applicability of the Lemon test in this instance, distinguishing these facts
from those that would trigger Lemon as attributable to the passivity of the
monument in question.59 Once the Court decided that Lemon did not apply,
the plurality analyzed the monument and its constitutionality through the
dual lenses of the monument's nature and the Nation's history.6° Under this
analysis, the Court cited "an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by
all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life...
,,61 Further, the Court recognized that despite the religious aspects of the
Ten Commandments, their religious significance does not make all
51 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 702.
54 Id. at 681.
55 Id. at 681-82.
56 Id. at 682.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 691-92.
59 Id. at 685-86.
60 Id. at 688-92.
61 Id. at 686 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)). The Court gave examples of this
unbroken history, including President George Washington's Thanksgiving Day Proclamation. Id.
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government displays of them unconstitutional.6 z These conclusions allowed
the Court to hold that the Texas monument did not violate the Establishment
Clause.
Justice Breyer, whose concurring opinion determined the outcome of
this case and whose vote gave McCreary a majority, wrote a separate
concurrence in Van Orden.63 His concurrence sheds light on both decisions.
Justice Breyer agreed with the plurality that "the Establishment Clause does
not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any
way partakes of the religious. 64 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer also disagreed
with the dissent (and part of the analysis by the majority opinion in
McCreary) by rejecting the sufficiency of tests aimed at evaluating the
neutrality of a challenged government action.65  These two vectors-
acknowledging religion in the public sphere to some degree yet retaining an
evaluation of neutrality--direct Justice Breyer to the conclusion that no test
could substitute for "the exercise of legal judgment" in cases such as these.66
This substitution of "legal judgment" for the tests applied in prior cases
allowed Justice Breyer to balance the religious content with the history of
both displays.67 After balancing these factors, he saw the Texas display as
"serving a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose. ' ' 68  His analysis
distinguishes the history of the Texas display from that of the McCreary
County displays in that "the short (and stormy) history of the courthouse
Commandments' displays demonstrates the substantially religious objectives
of those who mounted them."69 This distinction seems to drive Justice
Breyer's votes in both cases. His emphasis on the "stormy" history of the
McCreary County display suggests that had its history not manifested a
religious purpose, the display would fall within the allowable bounds of the
Establishment Clause. 70 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer's reliance on "legal
judgment" does not clarify how to find or evaluate this purpose. Similarly,
the absence of any such purpose-laden history surrounding the display in Van
62 Id. at 690 ("Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious
doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.").
63 Id. at 698-705.
64 Id. at 699.
65 Id.
6 Id. at 700.
67 Id. at 700-02.
68 Id. at 703.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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Orden led Justice Breyer to conclude that it does not violate the
Establishment Clause.71
Justice Stevens dissented in Van Orden, arguing that the monument
served no function other than presenting the text of the Ten Commandments
and that, as such, it violated the Establishment Clause.72 He argued that,
without either an explicit or an implicit tie to Texas' state history or to the
founding of the nation, the monument served a solely religious purpose and
thus violated principles of neutrality and endorsement.73 Stevens adamantly
asserted that Scalia's proposed construction of the Establishment Clause
would lead to "unpalatable result[s]. '74
Justices Souter and O'Connor also dissented.75 Justice Souter's
dissent adopted neutrality "as a general rule," although recognizing that the
Constitution does not mandate "absolute governmental neutrality toward
religion. 7 6  Justice Souter expressed the view that a display of the Ten
Commandments cannot comport with the Establishment Clause requirement
of neutrality except when the display can be proven to carry primarily
77nonreligious purposes. His dissent emphasized a prior Supreme Court case
that held unconstitutional the display of the Ten Commandments in a
classroom setting.
III. Issues Arising from McCreary and Van Orden
The Court's divided resolution to the twin Ten Commandments
cases raises several issues. Because the Ten Commandments are religious
tenets, cases involving government displays of the Ten Commandments pose
the fundamental question of whether symbolic government endorsement of
religion is proper.79 A display of religious messages or monuments
constitutes government action with some religious purpose or effect. The
71 Id.
72 Id. at 707-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 729 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These results, Justice Stevens asserts, would replace
Jefferson's metaphor of a wall of separation between church and state with a "wall of exclusion"
separating Christians and adherents to other religions. Id. Further, Justice Stevens argues that Scalia's
approach would result in the unincorporation of one clause of the First Amendment and in constitutional
backing for governmental religious discrimination. Id.
75 Id. at 737 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter wrote for himself and Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote a brief separate dissent supporting Justice Souter and referencing
her concurrence in McCreary. Id. at 736-37.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 737; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
79 The Court noted the religious nature of the displays at issue in both cases. McCreary County
v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 868 (2005); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690.
444
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Court has found some government actions with religious purpose or effect,
such as the erection of a creche on public property, to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. ° Therefore, the question of how to determine when
a government action affecting religion violates the Constitution remains
open, subject to refinement and development of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. 8'
The interplay of the two cases and their combined potential effect on
Establishment Clause jurisprudence raises several issues. One such issue
concerns whether dissenters must opt out of situations similar to those
presented by McCreary and Van Orden, as dissenters to offensive visual
material, whose remedy is to avert their eyes.82 Whether such dissenters feel
ostracized by such displays can contribute to the analysis. If dissenters to
objectionable visual imagery feel alienated from society by their discomfort
in its presence, their situation does not differ substantially from those whose
discomfort arises from the presence of a Ten Commandments display.
Further, a requirement that a party take affirmative steps to avoid the
discomfort associated with such a display could seem to aggravate any
encroachment on the dissenters; however, such a requirement would not vary
from the comparable situation of those in the presence of objectionable
visual imagery being required to avert the eyes.
To expand on the opting out requirement, a reversal of roles can
prove illuminating. We can consider the issue of whether mandatory
inclusion of evolution in public school curriculum violates the Establishment
Clause as endorsing the belief-choices of adherents to "secularism" and
opposing the alternative belief choice of "creationism." Stated as such, the
requirement that an adherent to another religion opt out, or simply silently
reject the position being presented, could seem reasonable. 83  When
addressing this issue, evaluating whether the dissenters' opting-out actions or
their sensitivity to a feeling of ostracism should invalidate otherwise
80 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that the Nebraska legislature's practice
of opening each session with a prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause); see also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the display of a Chanukah menorah outside a city
and county building did not violate the Establishment Clause).
S I phrase this as "government action affecting religion" to include both actions that favor and
that disfavor religion in violation of the principles underlying the Establishment Clause.
82 See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975) (holding that a city ordinance
violated the First Amendment where it prohibited the display of potentially offensive movies when
observers had the option of averting their eyes).
83 Secularism has no denomination, nor does it espouse any religious organization. I merely label
it as "religion" to present a parallel construction. Depending on one's definition of religion, secularism
might be labeled either a religion, if the choice whether to believe or not is labeled one of faith, or as a
quasi-religion in the alternative.
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acceptable action becomes enlightening. If the reverse position were
presented to a court (e.g., proposing creationism over evolution), the result
seems likely to result in a finding that instruction centered on "creationism"
would violate the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
McCreary points to this anomaly:
When the government associates one set of religious beliefs with the
state and identifies nonadherents as outsiders, it encroaches upon the
individual's decision about whether and how to worship. In the
marketplace of ideas, the government has vast resources and special
status. Government religious expression therefore risks crowding out
private observance and distorting the natural interplay between
competing beliefs. 84
This view suggests that governmental religious or nonreligious
expressions form part of a larger "marketplace of ideas" in which private
religious belief must compete with other ideas for broader public support and
acknowledgment. The imposition of Establishment Clause restrictions that
require some degree of privatization of religion and religious belief, but
preclude religion from serving as an adequate justification for public actions,
would effectively eliminate religion from the public sphere and would
violate the integrity of such a marketplaceY Because any opinion on the
religious involves an epistemic belief choice, restricting the expression of a
subset of such choices based on the choice to believe in God seems to violate
the ideals espoused in the Religion Clauses.
The weight given to the history of each display presents another
issue highlighted by the interplay of the two cases. The Court's use of this
factor suggests that it can have two separate effects on a Ten
Commandments display. McCreary suggests that the history of a display can
render unconstitutional an otherwise constitutional display. Because Justice
Breyer uses this point as a distinction, it seems that the Court deems the
counties' otherwise valid action in producing its third display as
unconstitutional because the county's earlier attempts to display the Ten
Commandments did not pass constitutional muster. This point suggests a
fundamental difference between the cases and presents a problematic
8 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostiliiiy to Religion, 78 VA. L. REv. 671, 678-
79 (1992) ("Keeping religion and religious belief confined to private life enables the ...state to
marginalize religion without eliminating it . . . . [G]ovemment . . . treats religion neutrally-as a
subjective value preference restricted to private life, rather than as objective knowledge proper to public
life. This position can be genuinely neutral, however, only if the boundary between the private world of
subjective preference and the public world of objective fact is natural, fixed, and inevitable.").
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question: why should an action with no independent constitutional violation
fail the Establishment Clause test because of past missteps? Justice Breyer
proposes no answer to this question. The Constitution's condemnation of
behavior wholly contained in past actions can be seen to violate notions of
fairness and justice. It is unclear how a county could possibly overcome its
history in such instances.
Furthermore, the result that government displays containing the Ten
Commandments are constitutional in some states but unconstitutional in
others yields confusing and anomalous results. As an example, the issue of
states allocating time during the school day for students to observe a moment
of silence has been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because the
modification to the statute added "and prayer" to the prior allowance for a
"moment of silence. '86  However, the Commonwealth of Virginia has
enacted a statute allowing for daily observance of one minute of silence,
which courts have upheld.87 As a result, the same legislative action may be
constitutional in some states, but unconstitutional in others.
Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary noted that "[f]ederal, state, and
local governments across the Nation have engaged in such display[s]." 88 To
hold here that the display violates the Constitution seems to create a similar
legal anomaly as the moment of silence example, suggesting the time has
come for a change in the law. The display that the Court struck down in the
Kentucky counties might be found constitutional in a different jurisdiction.
Such a result is at best arbitrary and at worst unjust.
The determinative nature of the history of the display presents
further difficulties. Justice Breyer, by using the history of the display as a
conclusive distinguishing factor between McCreary and Van Orden, presents
86 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
87 VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (2006); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 996 (upholding Virginia's "moment of silence" statute as passing the purpose prong).
88 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 907, n 11. Scalia's footnote states:
The significant number of cases involving Ten Commandments displays in the last two
years suggests the breadth of their appearance. See, e.g., Books v. Elkhart County, 401
F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 2005) (Ten Commandments included in a display identical
to the Foundations display); Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th
Cir. 2005) (Ten Commandments monument in city park since 1965); Modrovich v.
Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2004) (Ten Commandments plaque,
donated in 1918, on wall of Allegheny County Courthouse); Freethought Soc. Of
Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (Ten
Commandments plaque, donated in 1920, on wall of Chester County Courthouse); King
v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1273-74 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (Ten Commandments
depicted in county seal since 1872).
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an under-inclusive analysis that might preclude the government from acting
favorably with respect to religions without a longstanding tradition in this
country or to religions that fall outside the mainstream of socially acceptable
beliefs. This would result from the acceptability of the Texas display in Van
Orden based on its forty-year history. Justice Breyer's conclusion can be
interpreted as finding that any monument with a sufficiently long history
would not violate the Establishment Clause. Such an implication would
yield the incongruous result that government may act in ways that passively
support longstanding religions, but not in support of newer religions without
such a history.
It is questionable whether courts should be in the business of
assessing what length of time constitutes an adequate history to withstand
challenge under the Establishment Clause. Justice Breyer's opinion does not
address the fallout of this type of distinction.89  Religions with a less
entrenched history in the United States could justifiably oppose this sort of
framework. These religions could assert that a classification based on the
history of a religious display should not relate to the Court's decision as to
whether the display passively supports or favors a religion.90
On the other hand, Justice Breyer's conclusion might alternatively
imply that passive government action favoring religion violates the
Establishment Clause when the action results in significant protests, as
suggested in the New York Times.91 Surely Justice Breyer would not intend
this result, but his opinion allows for the inferential leap nevertheless.92 Such
an implication would raise different issues from the previous one; however,
the issues raised under both interpretations yield similar results. If
government actions are acceptable so long as they generate few protests, the
result is a rule supporting tyranny of the majority. If the prevailing
viewpoint raised enough criticism of the action or had sufficient resources to
89 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677, 698-705 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
90 See id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[l]n today's world, in a Nation of so many different
religious and comparable nonreligious fundamental beliefs, a more contemporary state effort to focus
attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive in a way that this longstanding, pre-
existing monument has not.").
91 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow a Commandments Display, Bar Others, N.Y. T.IEs, June
28, 2005, at Al (stating "it appear[s] that religious symbols that have been on display for many years, with
little controversy, are likely to be upheld, while newer displays intended to advance a... religious agenda
will be met with suspicion and disfavor from the court.").
92 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704 (stating "[tlhis display has stood apparently uncontested for
nearly two generations. That experience helps us understand that as a practical matter of degree this
display is unlikely to prove divisive. And this matter of degree is, I believe, critical to a borderline case
such as this one.") (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). By distinguishing McCreary from Van
Orden, Justice Breyer places significant, if not dispositive, weight on the level of protest brought about by
each display.
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challenge an action with which it did not agree, that majority could invalidate
otherwise valid action. Such a result could yield disproportionate power to
majority religions and to those religious and nonreligious organizations
wielding the most resources to wage the sort of intellectual or spiritual
warfare that may cause a court to find that an action violates the Constitution
solely because of the history surrounding the action.
IV. Methods of Analysis under the Establishment Clause
These issues raised by the 2005 Ten Commandments cases can help
in an evaluation of the propriety of various legal frameworks with respect to
the Establishment Clause cases. The desirability of each approach is largely
determined by which issues one seeks to give consideration and weight.
Although more approaches have been proposed than those analyzed here,93
three prominent approaches have most often been applied or suggested in
relation to Ten Commandments cases and to Establishment Clause cases
generally: the Lemon test; the "endorsement" test; and the "coercion" test.
A. Lemon test
The Lemon test mentioned in both McCreary and Van Orden is a
three-prong analysis derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman.94  The test imposes
requirements on government action challenged for being violative of the
Establishment Clause.95 The government must show: (1) that the action had
93 See, e.g., Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 761 (June 2005) (advocating federalism as the proper analytic approach to the
Establishment Clause). Federalism as a solution to religious freedom jurisprudence seems to sidestep the
true problem of arriving at an acceptable criterion for deciding such cases. As such, the merits and
drawbacks of such a solution remain the topic for another article.
Another alternative approach ties the religious freedom issue to freedom of speech, unifying
the First Amendment. Such an approach has been met with substantial success in the judiciary. See Alan
Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal
Neutrality, 18 J. L. & POL. 119 (Winter 2002) (questioning whether such an approach would be
desirable). If such an approach were adopted, the freedom of speech issues might conflict with some
religious belief choice decisions, leading to questions about whether religious or nonreligious objectors
should be required to avert the eyes. Examples of the conflicts that could arise include the obscenity
example. One might ask whether the religious objector should be required to avert the eyes when
confronted with obscenity conflicting with his or her belief choices. Similarly, a nonreligious person
might object to the religious ties in Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech. Should
such an objection be overruled similarly to the obscenity example, merely requiring the objector to avert
the eyes? Allowing or rejecting both objections seems to be required if the Free Speech and freedom of
religion analyses are merged; however, such a result seems to violate the purposes of those protections.
94 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
95 id. at 612.
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2007)
"a secular... purpose"; 96 (2) that the action's "principal or primary effect...
neither [advances] nor [inhibits] religion"; and (3) that the action does not
result in undue entanglement between government and religion.97 The
Supreme Court's leading case on Ten Commandments displays applied this
test.98 In subsequent cases, the Court extended this test to require more than
merely "a secular purpose" as it had written in Lemon; instead, the action
must demonstrate a genuine secular purpose. 99 The holding in McCreary
added to this judicial gloss by requiring more than merely a genuine secular
purpose, striking the counties' displays because "the secular purpose [was]
secondary."' t°
In evaluating the Lemon test, however, the Court's tendency to
abandon it becomes important. As indicated by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority in Van Orden, the Court began disregarding the
Lemon approach soon after its inception. 10 1 Justice Scalia further observed
that by 2005, a majority of the Court already rejected Lemon as the
controlling test. °2  Scholars also indicate that the Court has generally
abandoned the Lemon test-one even indicating that it may already be
dead. 10 3 Nevertheless, the McCreary decision clearly indicates that the test is
still breathing.
S Commentary and criticism of this prong of the test comes later, in the analysis of the
endorsement approach to the Establishment Clause, because of its particular relevance to that discussion.
Furthermore, criticism of the Lemon test has reached levels where the viability of the test as a whole is in
question, making analysis of its component parts less relevant where this will appear below. See infra note
103.
97 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
98 Stone, 449 U.S. at 39. In Stone, the Court addressed the public display of the Ten
Commandments and held unconstitutional Kentucky's displays. Id. Stone involved a statute requiring the
display of a large copy of the Decalogue in school classrooms throughout the state. Id. at 39 nl. This
display would also include small print stating that the Ten Commandments form a part of the foundation
for Western legal traditions and for the common law of the United States. Id. The Court noted that the
use of the Ten Commandments in this statute, despite Kentucky's avowed secular purpose, could not
escape its inherent religious nature. Id. at 41-42. Thus, the statute failed the purpose prong of the Lemon
test, and the Court held it unconstitutional. Id.
99 See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.290, 308 (2000) (finding a sham
purpose behind the governmental action and striking that action down as lacking a genuine legislative
purpose).
100 McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005).
101 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (stating that "just two years after Lemon was
decided, we noted that the factors identified in Lemon serve as no more than helpful signposts") (internal
citations omitted).
102 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The Lemon test] is discredited . . .
because a majority of the Justices on the current Court (including at least one Member of today's
majority) have, in separate opinions, repudiated the brain-spun 'Lemon test' that embodies the supposed
principle of neutrality between religion and irreligion.")
103 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman:
Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993) (elaborating upon the rejection of the Lemon test as
the analytical approach to the Establishment Clause).
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B. Endorsement
The prevailing alternative to the Lemon test in Establishment Clause
analysis asks whether the government action constitutes an "endorsement" of
a religion or of religion in general.1°4 Justice O'Connor authored this
approach, which has become the prevailing view regarding Ten
Commandments cases. 105 The test essentially reduces the three prongs of
Lemon to two: secular purpose and effect of endorsement. °6
Justice O'Connor's reduction of the test into two prongs largely
retains Lemon's analytical content, but diminishes the required analysis. She
described her endorsement approach as:
Prohibit[ing] government from making adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person's standing in the political community ....
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.
0 7
Her endorsement-based test retains the secular purpose prong.
10 8
This prong of the Lemon test has received much criticism, including
questioning of the ability of a court to determine legislative intent."°9
104 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
105 See 16A Am. Jur. 2d § 436 (2005) ("In considering whether the erection, maintenance, or
display of religious structures or symbols on public property constitutes a violation of religious freedom,
the Supreme Court has said that, to withstand the strictures of the establishment clause, state action
asserted to violate that clause must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.").
106 Id.
107 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109 See Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment
Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (Fall 2002). Idleman indicates that the determination of
legislative purpose creates several problems. Id. Among these, the determination of original legislative
intent does not end the inquiry; a secular contemporary legislative purpose can cure a statute enacted for
purely religious purposes. Id. at 14-15. Likewise, the potential of confusion or conflation between the
legislative purposes and the individual or collective legislators' purposes poses a significant difficulty in
applying the purpose prong. Id. at 18-19. For example, a statute's language itself might proclaim one
purpose, contrasted with the varying purposes of the legislators voting for its passage. In determining
whether this statute has a secular purpose (or, depending on the variation of the purpose prong being
applied, a genuinely secular purpose or a genuine, primarily secular purpose), the weight attached to the
legislation's wording versus the legislators' individual or collective intentions in passing it presents no
clear solution.
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Additionally, the general notion of prohibition on endorsement allows for
multiple interpretations of the word "endorsement."" 1 Indeed, Steven D.
Smith comments, "[T]he concept of endorsement seems both elusive and
elastic."' This elasticity of the general concept of endorsement may be one
of its stronger qualities because of the flexibility it gives to the analytical
framework applied to the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, this
flexibility causes the predictability of Establishment Clause cases to suffer."
2
Further, the possibility that each Justice could interpret "endorsement"
differently depending on the case "threatens to aggravate existing doctrinal
confusion." 13
It0 See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (Nov. 1987). Professor Smith outlines four
varieties of endorsement: "exclusive preferment. ... endorsement of truthfulness,... value endorsement,.
. . [and] accommodation endorsement." Id. at 276-77. Smith also notes that Justice O'Connor's Wallace
v. Jaffree opinion gave "analytical content" to the endorsement test, emphasizing "deferential and limited"
review of legislative intent and elaborating on the "perception" prong. Id. at 272. This opinion proposes
an "objective observer"-familiar with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the law in
question, not to mention familiarity with the values recognized in the free exercise clause. Id. Under the
endorsement approach, "the constitutionality of a measure helpful to religion would depend on whether
the legislators acted-and were perceived as having acted-because they believe in religion (in which
case the measure would probably be considered an invalid endorsement) or because they believe their
constituents believe in religion (in which case the measure would be a permissible accommodation)." Id.
at 279. As such, the purpose prong exhibits problematic elements, which undermine its useful attributes.
Id. at 301. Although Smith's argument that "inquiries into the intent of government officials are
inherently treacherous" fails to persuade most who acknowledge the value of ascertaining legislative
intent as a means of evaluating the validity of a piece of legislation, the deeper issues surrounding the
Lemon purpose prong and its counterpart in the endorsement test render these analytical frameworks less
valuable. Id. at 284.
III Id. at 276.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 278. Smith elaborates, pointing out that "a sweeping prohibition ...would force
government to ignore religion's distinctive interests and needs .... Moreover, in a polity in which
government regularly acknowledges and accommodates citizen interests of various sorts, deliberate
indifference toward one class of interests may easily shade into, and become indistinguishable from,
disapproval-which Justice O'Connor's test would also forbid." Id. Further, in evaluating an
accommodation endorsement prohibition, Smith states, "the line separating accommodation endorsements
from endorsements of truthfulness or value is so thin as to be virtually invisible." Id. at 279. An approach
allowing endorsements of value, but not of truthfulness walks a fine line as "there is no reliable way for a
court to determine whether school prayer, or aid to parochial schools, or publicly sponsored nativity
scenes [or Ten Commandments displays], indicate that the religious ideas or causes they represent are
'true' or merely that such ideas or causes are 'good."' Id. Finally, an analysis that allows exclusive
preferment of religion or nonreligion dispenses with the religious freedom protections of the First
Amendment altogether. Id. at 283. Moreover, the insertion of Justice O'Connor's intermediary for direct
endorsement-perception of endorsement-"raises a critical question: Whose perceptions count?" Id. at
291. Some might perceive this intermediary as overcoming the difficulties inherent in the purpose prong.
See Smith, supra note 110 and accompanying note. Once one acknowledges the question 'Whose
perceptions count?,' however, the two proposed responses provide no additional help. These responses
suggest that either real human beings or a "hypothetical 'objective observer"' could be used to determine
whether an action is perceived as endorsing religion. If real human beings provide this perception, the
problem becomes how to assess the perception. They possibility of public opinion polls deciding when
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Justice O'Connor's development of the endorsement test addresses
these difficulties specifically. She suggests that courts determine whether the
action had the effect of endorsement through an objective observer. 14 The
insertion of a hypothetical "objective observer" has not cured this problem;
such an imagined outsider can only observe as much as its creator observes,
thus collapsing the observer-modified test back to the original endorsement
test prior to this insertion. 15  Indeed, one critic suggests that Justice
O'Connor's objective observer is none other than Justice O'Connor
herself.1 6 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's supposition that this "objective"
observer also has familiarity with the text of any challenged statute, with its
legislative history, with the implementation of the law in question, and with
the Supreme Court's prior decisions on the Establishment Clause stretches
the objectivity requirement far beyond the "typical" observer. 1 7  This
heightened objectivity seems to explicitly collapse the test to its first prong in
that the hypothetical observer with familiarity with the statute and its
surrounding purpose would merely validate the judge who reached the
second prong, giving an affirmation of his or her correct assessment of the
purpose prong." 8 This would make the interposition of this hypothetical
observer a purely intellectual exercise designed to appease the conscience of
any given action endorses religion so as to render the action unconstitutional opens the door to a tyranny
of the majority. Id. at 291-92. Such a result would offend the concepts of religious freedom and
protection of individual religious beliefs embodied in the Establishment Clause. If, however, the
alternative of a hypothetical objective observer assumes the role of determining whose perceptions count,
such a solution presents different problems. Smith argues that "a purely fictitious character will perceive
precisely as much, and only as much, as its author wants it to perceive; and there is no empirical
touchstone .. .to show that the author was wrong." Id. Furthermore, such an approach involving the
hypothetical observer "logically tends to bring about the collapse of O'Connor's second prong into her
first prong .. . . [T]he judge who examines the text, background, and implementation of a law and
concludes that the law was not intended to endorse religion should rule that an 'objective observer'
examining the same factors would draw the same conclusion. To rule otherwise would be to confess that
the judge is not being 'objective.'" Id. at 293.
"4 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-92 (1984) (stating that to fulfill the Lemon two-
prong test one must find what the "objective" meaning of the statement was to the community).
115 Id.; see also Note, Context is in the Eye of the Beholder: Establishment Clause Violations and
the More-Than-Reasonable Person, 80 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 981 (2005) (criticizing the hypothetical
"objective observer" as inevitably and invariably subjectively influenced).
116 See Robert A. Holland, A Theory of Establishment Clause Adjudication: Individualism, Social
Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in Identifying Threats to Religious Liberty, 80 CAL. L. REV.
1595, 1663 (1992) (commenting that "a fictitious observer who embodies only those qualities that the
judge chooses to attribute to that observer is either the 'average person' with a new name or a vehicle for
the judge's own biases").
17 Id.; see also Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment of
Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 293 (1987) (stating that the "objective
observer" will be familiar with the text, legislative history, and background of the statute under review).
118 Id.
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the judge creating it, but never solving the problems necessitating its
existence. 1 9 In addition, the application of the test with its "objective
observer" component does not clarify the analysis. Other justices have
applied the endorsement test without reaching the same result as one
another. 12 Thus, Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach faces significant
obstacles.
Beyond these criticisms, however, the purpose prong allows for the
potential of hostility toward religion in general. As Professor Gedicks has
noted, "the privileging of secular knowledge in public life as objective and
the marginalization of religious belief in private life as subjective has been a
foundational premise of American jurisprudence under the Religion Clause
of the First Amendment."'12' A court might strike down some displays that
seem supportive of religion even when not perceived to be intended as such
or when their actual effect did not endorse religion but their perceived effect
was one of endorsement. Such a result presents a paradox of reasoning. One
built-in problem with such reasoning questions is determining whose
perceptions count. Justice Breyer answers that with a simple phrase:
"judicial judgment."' 122  Setting that issue aside, whether the action actually
affects the endorsement does not alter the perception. This would lead to the
result that an action that in fact alienates a religious group, if not perceived as
intentional or if not viewed as having an effect of endorsement, could be held
not to violate the Constitution despite its actual effect. Surely this confused
analysis under the endorsement approach does not either clarify or simplify
the current state of First Amendment jurisprudence. 1
23
Furthermore, the underlying notion of neutrality espoused in
McCreary and implied in the endorsement analysis presents similar
problems. 24  This neutrality is the foundation of the nondiscrimination
19 Id. at 292.
120 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 807-08 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the objective observer need not be familiar with the statute's text,
legislative history, and implementation or with Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
121 Fredrick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 681 (1992).
122 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing how
complex the goals of the Establishment Clause are and concluding that no test can substitute the exercise
of legal judgment).
123 See Smith, supra note 117, at 301 ("[D]isparate conclusions underscore the analytical
deficiencies which destroy the test's usefulness as a practical doctrinal tool.").
124 See Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The Constitutional
Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2005) (emphasizing the
fundamental role that neutrality currently plays in religious freedom jurisprudence, pointing out the flaws
in such an approach, and promoting nonpreferentialism [accommodationism] as a more desirable
alternative).
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suggestion as well.125 In McCreary, the majority assigned a high degree of
importance to neutrality, describing it as "an interpretive guide."' 1 6  The
concept of neutrality defies easy definition; indeed, "[w]hen considering its
meaning in any particular context, one must invariably ask: 'Neutral how and
as to what?"' 12 7 When imposing a standard of neutrality, one might mean
that the decision-maker must impose on him or herself an artificial,
intentional indifference toward the parties involved in the dispute. ,28
Another interpretation may suggest that neutrality means "undertaking or
justifying political action on the ground that it neither promotes nor enables
individuals a religious idea or practice unless there is a valid independent
reason other than favoring or hindering the same." 129 Neutrality could also
mean "intentional noninterference by the state with the religious" or "the
state ensuring for all citizens equal opportunity to advance in the public
square any permissible religious idea or practice they freely affirm." 
130
In sum, the concept of neutrality within the context of religious
freedom "stamps with the air of public legitimacy any underlying political
theory that it serves to conceal, whether the theory is classical liberalism,
communitarianism, revised liberalism, de facto establishmentarianism, or
some intermediate position. '131 Such a conclusion illustrates the
fundamental difficulties with the notion of neutrality. These difficulties
compound when a test involving neutrality reaches the application phase. At
that stage, one might legitimately ask who decides what definition should
apply. Among the possible replies to this inquiry are the religious observer,
the nonreligious observer, both (a compromise position, possibly reached
through some form of mediation), a referendum election, or a judge. The
only reasonable outcome would leave it up to a judge to decide which variety
of neutrality to apply, which could possibly lead to different kinds of
neutrality to be applied under varying circumstances. Such an approach may
125 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Focusing on
institutional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an
analytical framework.").
126 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2005).
127 L. Scott Smith, "Religion -Neutral" Jurisprudence, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., 815, 816-17
(2005).
128 Id. at 817.
129 Id.
130 See id. (elaborating that these theories indicate the possibility of either a "positive" or a
"negative" neutrality). Smith asserts that between these four generic meanings of neutrality could exist a
"continuum of intermediate meanings" that would stretch the scope of his (and this) work infinitely
beyond its bounds). Id. at 818. He goes on to analyze the historical underpinnings of each approach to
neutrality. Id. at 820.
131 Id. at 869.
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have some residual appeal initially, but seems to fall short in light of studies
indicating that the most dispositive influence on judicial decision-making in
the religious freedom context is:
religion-religion in terms of affiliation of the claimant, the
background of the judge, and the demographics of the community ....
[The] findings indicate that, viewing the federal judiciary collectively
and evaluating the tipping point of difficult and contested religious
freedom cases at the margins, religious factors are meaningfully
associated with judging outcomes.'
32
This being the case, the issue of neutrality remains salvageable.
Steven D. Smith has aptly pointed to the metaphor of a judge as neutral
decision-maker as indicative of the true meaning of neutrality: "adherence to
accepted or proper criteria of decision."'' 33 Thus, the insertion of a neutrality
requirement into the analysis applicable the Religion Clauses begs the
question of what criteria of decision-or analysis-should be applied.
C. Coercion
A final approach that the Court has employed, and that remains
available as an alternative analytical framework for Establishment Clause
cases, centers on the compulsion or coercion element of religious freedom.
Justice Kennedy implemented the "coercion" test in a 1992 opinion.' 34 The
test simplifies Establishment Clause analysis, reducing it to the question of
whether:
the government may ... require or restrict conduct that either is
intrinsically religious or is regulated by the government because of its
potential religious meaning. More specifically, [the test asks whether]
the government may... compel participation in religious programs....
[or] compel religious profession or observance outright, and [if ]it may
... impose legal penalties upon persons because they claim adherence
to a particular religion or to no religion at all.
13 5
132 Gregory C. Sisk, Mighael Heise & Andrew P. Morris, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 614 (2004).
133 Smith, supra note 117, at 328.
134 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (utilizing a coercion approach in the majority
opinion's evaluation of the Establishment Clause).
135 See Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment
Clause, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 49 (Fall 2002) (criticizing the purpose and effect prongs of
analysis under other approaches, analyzing the coercion test, indicating the prevalence of moral judgments
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This question splits the horns of the dilemma created, perhaps
artificially, through the division of the religious protection provisions of the
Constitution into the warring Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
Rather than pitting one against the other, the coercion approach unifies the
analysis, allowing the clauses to operate without introducing the
schizophrenia of purpose into the Framers' draft of the First Amendment.
Joining the two religion clauses of that amendment under the overarching
theme of government non-coercion not only frees religion clause analysis
from this conflict, it also simplifies the test applicable to cases arising under
the religion clauses. Whereas the current system applies some variation of
the endorsement and Lemon tests to questions of whether government action
establishes religion, the coercion test would approach such questions without
that characteristic disunity. Furthermore, the coercion framework is
considerably easier to apply than the fragmented approaches tied together
under the current approaches. Coercion avoids the difficulties of attempting
to define neutrality. Likewise, the coercion test does not concern itself with
purposes underlying government action. The test focuses on actual results
and real infringements on liberties instead of intended (but perhaps not
actual) endorsements of religion.
Criticisms of such an approach focus on the inability of a coercion
test to provide adequately for the varieties of circumstances presented by
increasingly divisive and complex questions of religious liberties. Some
have proposed a stronger version of this unified approach by advocating an
analytical backdrop to the religion clauses that precludes government action
that uses religion as a basis for classification. 136 Such a framework might
address the situations arising under the religion clauses more forcefully;
however, this approach seems to eliminate any differentiation between
religious freedom analysis and approaches addressing other freedoms,
dissolving any difference in approach for the First Amendment from that of
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. As such, an analytical
approach reducing the mode of analysis applicable under the First
Amendment to that introduced by the Fourteenth seems to dissolve the
influencing the law, and noting the acceptability of religiously informed legislation, so long as that
legislation does not infringe upon or coerce religious preferences).
136 See Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989
SUP. CT. REv. 373 (1989) (updating Kurland's research and suggesting that prohibiting government
action based upon a classification using religion as its basis would have produced a clearer and more
unified Establishment Clause jurisprudence than the current approach).
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distinct protections included in the Bill of Rights into those encompassed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Despite the criticisms, the coercion test appears to offer a viable
alternative to the current murky Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
37
Notwithstanding its apparent viability, however, the test retains problematic
elements that would require more detailed analysis and definition before the
test could be viable. One of these elements carries over from any other
approach to religious freedom issues: the problem of defining religion, which
the Supreme Court will not address. Just as in the other tests, the fringes of
the analytical framework of the coercion test present problems. In any test
calculated to address freedom of religion, the definition of religion itself
creates philosophical and intellectual difficulties. This definitional problem
cannot be overcome simply through adoption of a new test such as coercion;
however, approaching cases under a coercion analysis will not aggravate
those problems. Thus, the coercion approach cannot provide all of the
answers, but one cannot fault it for the inherent difficulties of the overriding
problem it attempts to address more efficiently.
Similarly, the scope of the test would require elaboration through
judicial interpretation. This is necessary to understand the degree to which
courts may intervene. Because the definition of coercion has not already
been concretely established, the test could ultimately yield results that would
make it less desirable than other alternative approaches to the religion
clauses. More likely, however, the judicial definition of "coercion" would
allow for judicial intervention when government action either unduly
rewarded or penalized based upon one's faith. Under such a definition of
coercion, the courts would have sufficient flexibility to balance liberty
interests and to strike down any action that impinges on religious liberties,
irrespective of the religion's majority or minority status.13 8  Therefore,
despite its inherent difficulties, coercion offers a viable and desirable
alternative to the current doctrinal rules, minimizing inconsistencies and
comporting well with public policy considerations. Judge Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit has helped in elaborating this scope, writing that
"Establishment" entails coercion .... Words do not coerce. A barrage
of advertisements tempting young people to join the military does not
137 See Smith, supra note 117, at 331 n.236, 332 (suggesting an exploration of "other doctrinal
alternatives" to the Court's current approach, particularly advocating the coercion test as one of the more
viable alternatives).
138 See Thomas G. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919,
939-40 (2004) (advocating the inclusion of the principle of protecting minority religions within the
foundational ideas underlying the religion clauses).
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oblige anyone to do so; no more does display of the Ten
Commandments coerce support for religion . . . . No one would
understand any document's presence in [a] display to suggest that [the
government] imposes either legal or social sanctions on
nonbelievers. 1
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Easterbrook's statement reveals some advantages of the coercion test
and its positive results on Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Under this
type of test, the Court would gain clarity and avoid the anomalous results of
the secular purpose prong of the Lemon and endorsement tests. Further,
neutrality would no longer be an issue, yielding a more reliable guidepost to
lower court judges.
Despite these advantageous aspects of the coercion test, much
remains uncertain in its implementation due to its never having commanded
a pure majority of the Court. Consequently, the practical concerns of its
effect, should the Court adopt it, could cast a long shadow over the test's
viability. In applying the test, the Court might emphasize direct coercion to
the neglect of indirect means of coercing religious belief choices on others.
Such a result would likely please many who would advocate the test, but
would ignore the fundamental principles of religious freedom that the test
should protect. In spite of these uncertainties, the current state of the law
indicates that it is time for a change in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Given the Court's inability to reach a consensus in adoption or application of
either the endorsement test or the Lemon test, the Court should now look to
other alternatives to bring uniformity to the law and clarity to lower court
judges. The coercion test shows promise as a viable alternative.
V. Coercion and the Ten Commandments
A. The 2005 Ten Commandments Cases
The McCreary case applied the endorsement test and rejected the
display as having failed the purpose prong of that test.' 4° Such an approach
characterizes the government action of displaying a series of documents
including the Ten Commandments as government endorsement of religion.
139 City of Elkhart v. Books, 401 F.3d 857, 869-70 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
140 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850-51 (2005).
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This result contradicts that reached in Van Orden and other cases.'14  Under
the approach used in Van Orden, which adopted an analysis evaluating the
display in the totality of the circumstances and in the context of its
surrounding history and tradition, the display was deemed harmonious with
that history and not violative of the Establishment Clause. 142
These results might differ if the coercion test were applied instead of
the Court's compromise approaches. In McCreary, the coercion test would
ask whether the display imposed some sanction on those whose beliefs
differed with the display. The stormy history of that display would be
irrelevant to the coercion analysis because the way the display came into
being has no bearing on whether action coerces or sanctions belief choices.
Thus, the display would likely pass the coercion test. Such a result should
not, however, shock the conscience of the Court because it comports with the
underlying principle of religious liberty embodied in the two religion clauses.
Judge Easterbrook's explanation of the coercion approach indicates that its
14' See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (stating that the Ten Commandments
display did not violate the Establishment Clause). The conflicting results of Ten Commandments cases
did not begin with Van Orden and McCreary. For a summary of Ten Commandments jurisprudence, see
107 A.L.R.5th 1; see also ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1042 (8th Cir. 2004) (striking
down a Ten Commandments monument as violative of the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test);
ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 2005) (reversing the earlier decision and
holding that a Ten Commandments monument did not violate the Establishment Clause given its
similarities to the monument in question in Van Orden and under the history and tradition test); Indiana
Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d. 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding a monument violative of
the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test); ACLU v. Mercer County, 240 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626 (E.D.
Ky. 2003) (granting summary judgment to the county in a suit alleging that its display violated the
Establishment Clause); ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 700-02 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (granting a
motion for preliminary injunction of a display similar to that in McCreary as a violation of the
Establishment Clause under the endorsement test); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471,488-89 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding a Ten Commandments display to be an impermissible endorsement of religion and thus violative
of the Establishment Clause); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 32-34 (10th Cir. 1973)
(upholding a Ten Commandments monument under the Lemon test); Byar v. Lee, 336 F. Supp. 2d 896,
905 (W.D. Ark. 2004) (striking down the posting of the Ten Commandments in a courtroom as the rules
of that courtroom under the Lemon test); City of Elkhart v. Books, 401 F.3d 857, 869 (7th Cir. 2005)
(upholding a Ten Commandments display under Lemon as secularly motivated and as effecting secular
results); Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2003) (vacating the
injunction against a plaque displaying the Ten Commandments, justifying this decision under the Lemon
test); King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1273 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (upholding the use of the county
seal as not violative of the Establishment Clause even though it includes the Ten Commandments);
Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 406-11 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that under the
endorsement test, the Ten Commandments plaque displayed by Allegheny County did not violate the
Establishment Clause); State of Colorado v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 898 P.2d 1013, 1026-27
(Colo. 1995) (holding that the Ten Commandments monument passed the endorsement test); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (holding that the posting of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky
schools violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test); Suhre v. Haywood City, 55 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399
(W.D.N.C. 1999) (holding that under the Lemon test, the display did not endorse or inhibit a particular
religious belief or lack thereof).
142 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691 ("Texas has treated her Capitol grounds monuments as
representing the several strands in the State's political and legal history.").
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ease of application and consistency would render it desirable and would
make its results likely to comport with principles of fairness. 1
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The twin decisions in 2005 regarding the Ten Commandments raise
the issue of what to do about religions that lack sufficient public support until
recently to incentivize public officials to display their symbols or speech.
These newer religions have no opportunity to have the history behind their
displays cure its otherwise invalidity. This leads to the question of whether
we should allow some displays to stand because they have a sufficiently
engrained history to make them historic landmarks, despite that this historic
nature only came about as a result of selective (if not discriminatory)
displaying of certain religious views and symbols. Similarly, one wonders
whether the inability of a government entity to format a display appropriately
the first time should negate its subsequent attempts to offer passive
acceptance of an otherwise constitutionally permissible display. Such a
result would seem counterintuitive at best, absurd at worst. Under the
combined approaches of McCreary and Van Orden, this result represents the
current state of the law. Under a coercion analysis, however, the Court could
avoid this undesirable end while maintaining doctrinal integrity.
As indicated throughout this Note, there is no perfect solution to
conflicts involving the religious liberties protected by the First Amendment.
Notwithstanding the impossibility of arriving at a one-size-fits-all resolution
to such issues, the coercion test presents a workable and satisfactory
approach to Ten Commandments cases specifically, if not to the
Establishment Clause cases more generally. As presently constituted, the
jurisprudence surrounding the Ten Commandments cases presents problems
of the viability of both the purpose prong and the notion of neutrality
included in both the Lemon and endorsement approaches. Furthermore, the
inconsistencies and incoherencies in the McCreary and Van Orden cases
render the current state of the law problematic. Under an alternative
approach such as the coercion test, the Court could most easily remedy such
problems. Additionally, the coercion test's approach would eliminate much
of the uncertainty and murkiness surrounding Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Adoption of coercion would not occur without difficulty;
such a development would require judicial interpretation of the term
"coercion." Nevertheless, under an approach similar to those indicated in
this note, the religion clauses could gain coherence and consistency. Further
studies could pick up the details of how to effectively implement such an
143 See Elkhart, 401 F.3d at 871 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Establishment
Clause bars governmental coercion and any claim short of that should fail for lack of standing).
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analytical framework and define such terms as well as addressing the
practical considerations of how to neutralize judicial participation in the
process of defining and rendering judgment on religious freedom issues.
Furthermore, other hypotheses could surface that might present a more
desirable alternative to any of the approaches presented here. As
circumstances currently stand, however, coercion appears to offer the most
fruitful avenues for the future of Ten Commandments jurisprudence.
